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The phenomenological effects of deep brain stimulation (DBS) on the self of the patient remains poorly understood and under
described in the literature, despite growing evidence that a significant number of patients experience postoperative
neuropsychiatric changes. To address this lack of phenomenological evidence, we conducted in-depth, semistructured
interviews with 17 patients with Parkinson’s disease who had undergone DBS. Exploring the subjective character specific to
patients’ experience of being implanted gives empirical and conceptual understanding of the potential phenomenon of DBS-
induced self-estrangement. Our study concluded that (1) the more patients preoperatively felt alienated by their illness, the
more they experienced postoperative self-estrangement, and (2) the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in association
with certain common qualitative characters, namely, loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement, and distorted
perception of capacities, which reveals a restorative estrangement. These findings indicate that subjective self-reports help us to
understand some aspects of the potential phenomenon of DBS-induced self-estrangement.
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Despite growing evidence that a significant number
of patients experience postoperative neuropsychiatric
changes (Volkmann, Daniels, and Witt 2010; Muller and
Christen 2011, Clausen 2010), including reports of irrevers-
ible alteration following removal of implants (Gilbert
2013a), the phenomenological effects of deep brain stimu-
lation (DBS) on the patient’s self remain poorly understood
and underdescribed in the literature. Most postoperative
reports emerging from clinical studies measure standard
cognitive, psychometric, and functional scales (Smeding
et al. 2011; Lewis et al. 2015; Pham et al. 2015; Schoenberg
et al. 2015). Most discussion of the postoperative changes
following the implantation of brain devices such as DBS
focuses on abnormal side effects caused by the interven-
tion (e.g., hypersexuality, hypomania). By contrast, rela-
tively little attention is paid to the idea that successfully
“treated” individuals might experience difficulties in
adjusting to becoming “symptom free”: a phenomenon
that is known as the “burden of normality” and that can
lead to postoperative iatrogenic harms (Gilbert 2012; Wil-
son, Bladin, and Saling 2007). The risk of postoperative iat-
rogenic harms can be extremely serious; in a statistically
significant number of clinical trials, implanted patients
have attempted or died by suicide (neurological condition:
Temel et al. 2009; psychiatric condition: Gilbert 2013a;
Gilbert 2013b). Given the failure of studies to faithfully
capture patients’ experience of a “new” postoperative self,
potential DBS-induced phenomenological effects on
patients’ self remain largely unexplored. DBS’s nontarget
effects and their impact on patients’ self are particularly
concerning, given the number of patients being implanted
for approved therapy (more‘ than 100,000) and the increas-
ing number enrolled in experimental trials (Medtronic
2013).
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To our knowledge, only a small number of studies in
the literature have specifically addressed the phenomenol-
ogy of the self through a patient’s subjective experience
with DBS (de Haan et al. 2015; de Haan et al. 2013, Hariz
et al. 2011, Sch€upbach et al. 2006). A small number of case
reports provide further insight into some of these postop-
erative changes to the self. With so few phenomenological
investigations into the experience of self, the philosophical
debates about potential postoperative effects of DBS on the
self are mostly based on anecdotal cases that may not be
representative, but are used to serve authors’ arguments. It
is essential to supplement the current literature with more
rigorous empirical studies exploring the phenomeno-
logical effects of DBS on the self. Studying patient’s
first-personal experience of DBS through the unique phe-
nomenological lens to explore patient’s self-perception
will shed light on current philosophical disputes, but most
importantly, will guide prospective patients through deci-
sion-making processes leading to implantation.
To address this lack of phenomenological evidence,
we conducted in-depth, semistructured interviews using
open-ended questions with 17 patients with Parkinson’s
disease (PD) implanted with DBS in Australia, from the
states of Victoria, Tasmania, and Queensland.1 The aver-
age duration of the interviews was 45 minutes. This
qualitative approach allowed us to capture first-personal
perspectives that are not identified by standardized
questionnaires and scales. Three independent research-
ers conducted the interviews and transcribed the con-
tent. All interviews were conducted in English.
Interviews were analyzed by grouping patients’ self-
experience into four main phenomenological clusters of
experience: (1) degrees of alienation caused by PD or
benefit caused by PD; (2) postoperative feelings of ena-
blement or powerlessness; (3) postoperative feelings of
embodiment or disembodiment; and (4) reports of post-
operative changes by partner/family members. These
clusters were then divided by subthemes, which were
populated by patients’ key answers and quotes. Table 1
reports patients’ details, and Appendix 1 is the semi-
structured questionnaire used to guide our interviews.
Our aim was to explore perceptions of self-change by
patients implanted with DBS. As this is a qualitative
study based on first-personal narratives involving more
than 765 minutes of interviews, the results are
highlighted and given in excerpt format.
This article (1) reports our general findings; (2) reports
and discusses findings related to deteriorative and restor-
ative self-estrangement; (3) discusses embodiment through
patients’ accounts of experiencing DBS implants as being
part of them; (4) summarizes the notion of self-estrange-
ment; (5) advocates that DBS alone does not directly causes
potential self-estrangement; (6) indicates some limits of
our research; and (7) provides general conclusions from
our collected data.
PATIENT SUBJECTIVE ACCOUNTS: EXPERIENCING
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
Before reporting our results, we need to define some termi-
nology. Exploring the phenomenon of DBS postoperative
self-estrangement involves an examination of whether
experiencing self-estrangement involves certain qualitative
experiences as phenomenally characterized by implanted
patients. From a phenomenological perspective, if we
define the self as, broadly construed, the subject of one’s
phenomenological experience of X (e.g., X being an emo-
tion, perception, thought, etc.), then we understand that
the very existence of some particular phenomenological
experiences can qualitatively reflect the self. By experience,
as Strawson formulated it, we understand experiential
“what-it’s-likeness” (Strawson 2011).2 The existence of a
self qualitatively experiencing X is given with the existence
of experiencing X. In other words, experiencing DBS likely
entails specific or common qualitative experiences; we
aimed to explore these specific or common DBS-related
experiences, especially any experiences of estrangement.
By looking at the subjective character specific to patients’
experience of being implanted, especially through phe-
nomenological experience of first-personal or subjective
change, we believe we can gain better empirical and con-
ceptual understanding of the phenomenology of potential
DBS-induced self-estrangement.
Our study reveals that there is a strong correlation
between postoperative estrangement and how patients
preoperatively perceive themselves with respect to their
illness. In other words, 100% of patients who perceived PD
as not intruding on their life did not experience feelings of
estrangement (n D 4). For instance, Patient 08 and Patient
12 clearly articulated this correlation:
Patient 08: “The disease is part of me. You can’t separate from
the disease” and “I don’t think [DBS] changed me, it hasn’t
changed my personality or who I am, or how I feel about
myself.”
Patient 12: “[Parkinson’s] is not a painful experience . . . I was
able to do things and contribute to society in ways I would
otherwise have been unable to do” and later pointed out that
“[DBS] has not changed who I am, it’s improved.”
1. This study was conducted in accordance with the Tasmanian
Human Research Ethics Committee regulations. Patient Consent
and Minimal Risk Ethics Application Approval, entitled
“H0014820 Deep Brain Stimulation and Postoperative Self-Adjust-
ment Phenomenon,” are also in compliance with the Tasmanian
Human Research Ethics Committee regulations. Ethical approval
was obtained in May 2015.
2. We draw on Strawson’s account here in order to justify looking
at the subjective experience of DBS implantation. We do recognize,
however, that this is a “thin” account of the self and that
Strawson’s conception of phenomenology can be contrasted with
a ”thick” account, which takes agency and embodiment as defin-
ing of the phenomenological standpoint.
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In parallel with this strong correlation between pre-
operative perception of oneself through disease and a
sense of estrangement, we observed that patients (61%)
who felt alienated by their illness were likely to experi-
ence, to various degrees and intermittently, some post-
operative feelings of self-estrangement (n D 8). For
example:
Patient 16: “[Parkinson’s disease] really takes over. . . . I
couldn’t work which was a big part of my identity. . . . If I
didn’t have the device I’d probably be dead right now”
and later states “I think that [DBS] does change you as a
person.”
Our findings indicate that the more patients preop-
eratively felt alienated by their illness, the more they
experienced postoperative self-estrangement. The ques-
tion that needs to be addressed in the next section is
how experiencing DBS self-estrangement correlates
with some specific qualitative character common to
some implanted patients.3
EXPERIENCING DETERIORATIVE AND RESTORATIVE
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
Our study found that postoperative self-estrangement
could be phenomenally experienced as deteriorative or
restorative by implanted patients. Deteriorative or restor-
ative self-estrangement involves experiencing an involun-
tary shift in the qualitative character. For instance:
Patient 04: “I can’t be the real me anymore—I can’t pretend . . .
I think that I felt that the person that I have been [since the
intervention] was somehow observing somebody else, but it
wasn’t me. . . . I feel like I am who I am now. But it’s not the
me that went into the surgery that time. . . .My family say they
grieve for the old [me] . . ..
Interviewer 2: “What have your children said to you about the
difference that they’ve seen before and after?”
Patient 04: “Yes, they said they don’t recognize me.”
Interviewer 2: “And in what way don’t they recognize you?”
Patient 04: “That I am so impulsive and seem to change my
mind all the time.”
What characterizes Patient 04’s postoperative feelings
of estrangement, as in other cases, can be understood by
way of the deteriorative effects on the patient’s self. We
believe Patient 04 mostly experienced deteriorative conse-
quences because Patient 04’s feelings of estrangement
largely appear to be correlated with a radical and ongoing
sense of loss of control over her previous self, which
reflects an involuntary and unintentional shift in her quali-
tative character. For instance, Patient 04 reported develop-
ing postoperative ongoing mania (medically diagnosed),
Table 1. Patients’ general information.
Patient Age (surgery) Gender
Time span between
surgery and interview
Time span between PD
diagnostic and surgery
P01 64 years old F 1 year 6 months 10 years
P02 68 years old F 1 year 20 years
P03 68 years old M 2 years 2 months 12 years
P04 52 years old* F 1 year 2 months 6 years
P05 82 years old F 3 years 12 years
P06 63 years old M 1 year 8 years
P07 53 years old F 4 years 9 years
P08 50 years old M 6 years 9 years
P09 54 years old* F 5 years 16 years
P10 58 years old M 1 year 11 years
P11 50 years old M 6 years 10 years
P12 66 years old M 1 year 11 years
P13 66 years old M 2 years 6 years
P14 40 years old M 4 years 7 years
P15 69 years old M 4 years 19 years
P16 ** F 3 years 6 months **
P17 52 years old M 5 years 8 years
*Patients had two surgeries. Patients’ ages during the second surgery.
**Was not provided.
3. In our study all patients (4 out of 4; 100%) reporting that PD
enhanced their life also reported a general feeling of postoperative
self-continuity. Some patients clearly experienced the opposite (8
out of 13; 61%): namely, they self-reported how PD devastated
their existence, and simultaneously reported how they experi-
enced postoperatively various degrees, intermittences, and inten-
sities of estrangement. For the five remaining patients (5 out of 13;
38%), their reports are too unclear to be classified. They experi-
enced PD as intruding in their life, but didn’t clearly report signifi-
cant postoperative estrangement. Thus, they couldn’t fit in our
classification of restorative or deteriorative estrangement.
AJOB Neuroscience
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leading to a suicide attempt, as well as a substantial
increase in impulsivity. Patient 04 said, “I cannot control
the impulse to go off if I’m angry.” As such, these findings
appear to further corroborate the hypothesis that deterio-
rative self-experiences seem to qualitatively characterize
the notion of powerlessness (Gilbert 2013a, 2015a), often
manifested through involuntary self-harming actions/
behaviors and/or loss of control.
It is a common mistake to think that postoperative feel-
ings of self-estrangement are qualitatively deteriorative.
Our study exposes that although DBS diminishes symp-
toms and restores patients’ control over their lives, more
patients experienced feelings of restorative estrangement
rather than deteriorative estrangement. For instance:
Patient 13: “[DBS] has allowed me to return almost to the per-
son I was before . . . It’s allowed me to be what I am, rather
than change what I am,” but while discussing this sudden
restorative feeling, Patient 13 confessed that DBS adversely
resulted in intermittent uncontrollable emotional sensitivity,
to the extent of experiencing “a state of hysterics . . . I felt like I
had lost my true self, it [is] way behind me.”
Patient 13’s experiences of restorative estrangement
seem to separate an old self (practically understood), “DBS
has partly restored my autonomy,” and a postoperative
qualitative character of this patient’s selfhood, “I had lost
my true self” as a result of the disease. Patient 13’s com-
ments illustrate that restorative estrangement can come in
degrees. In this respect, a patient might experience self-
rejuvenation while observing an involuntary shift in some
aspects of her qualitative character. Similarly:
Patient 11 first claimed: “it wasn’t so much that it changed
who you are, it rather restored who you are,” but he later
confessed that this novel restorative empowerment origi-
nated an uncontrollable phenomenon from which he disso-
ciated his self and does not recognize himself: “There’s
nothing that I can do [to stop this] ‘emotional incon-
tinence’4 as I call it. . . . If I had a choice I would say, ‘Look
see what you can do . . . to stop me from doing that.’
Because it does get embarrassing.”
Patient 11’s postoperative feelings of restorative
estrangement appear to increase some restorative capacities
that the patient seems to identify with as essential for his
preoperative and predisease self while admitting losing con-
trol of other aspects of his postoperative self. Aligning with
these feelings of postoperative restorative estrangement:
Patient 09 stated: “I felt I was 15 years younger after the oper-
ation . . . I felt so strong and confident . . . I could do anything
. . . I felt so good I tried to move the pool table and I ruptured
the disc in my back . . . I blame DBS for that because I felt so
good, I did something that I couldn’t have done when I was
21 and I don’t know why I thought I could do it when I was
54 . . . I was in a wheel chair for 2 months.”
Patient 09 “blames” the device for her ruptured disc
(i.e., she accepts it was her fault, but she attributes her
unreasonable confidence to the success of the device). We
observed that sometimes the device provided such levels
of heightened and uncharacteristic confidence that this
resulted in other unforseen difficulties. For example,
Patient 06 observed that he was bold in his activities, had
difficulties in refraining from engaging in numerous com-
mitments, and that he was in conflict with his wife: “I think
I have been causing a bit of problems in my relationships
by being just so full on. . . . I have to slow down that activ-
ity and make it more manageable for myself and my wife.”
In a similar way, Patient 09 was so confident in her new-
found strength and physical capabilities that she was
nearly permanently disabled when she attempted to lift
and move a large pool table. In this way, DBS may be con-
strued as so effective in relieving symptoms that it actually
causes people to have a distorted view of their own capa-
bilities. These distorted perceptions appear to induce the
belief that patients have (some) enhanced capacities far in
excess of their actual abilities. These distorted views of
their capacities are often described in the language of sud-
den unexpected strength.
For instance, Patient 07 described her feelings after
suddenly acting out of character during calibration. She
reported starting walking and wanting to reach her
husband’s location (i.e., by foot), which would have taken
her days. She explained her decision later by saying:
“Oh God, I wasn’t me, and I knew I wasn’t me and there was
nothing I could do about it . . . I knew what it was! I knew
[DBS] had been turned up that day. Unlike the drugs which
creep up on you, and you don’t know what’s happening.
With [DBS] I knew what it was, so I knew it was fixable.”
Here again, the device is similarly “blamed” for the
sudden restorative strength. The device is responsible, “I
knew what it was! I knew [DBS] had been turned up that
day,” for the distorted interpretation of her own capacities,
“I knew I wasn’t [my capacities].”
In parallel, while describing a sense of loss of control,
Patient 04 also recognized DBS had given her increased
feelings of strength (despite having mostly suffered from
deteriorative estrangement):
”I never had felt this lack of power or this giving of power—
until I had deep brain stimulation . . . It’s like the psychologist
said [to me]: for a woman who had a very invasive brain sur-
gery nine days ago and you’ve just walked 10 kilometres [to
get to your appointment]. And on the way I stopped and
bought a very uncharacteristic dress, backless—completely
different to what I usually do.”
Here, Patient 04’s “lack of power” in some aspects of her
character seems to be replaced by a “giving of power” with
respect to other novel qualitative features of character—that
4. DBS has turned Patient 11 into a SNAG (patient words), a phe-
nomenon beyond his control and putting him in discomfort. A
SNAG is an acronym for “Sensitive New Age Guy.”
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is, a loss of control leading to a disinhibition that is character-
ized by some incommensurable feelings of strength.
The collected restorative narratives seem to indicate
that DBS can distort patients’ feelings of who they are or
make them feel like they aren’t themselves in some ways,
capable of reaching unwanted limits beyond the preopera-
tive self, for instance, as well as inducing unintended
estrangement experiences of being in the world.
Given the preceding discussion, our study shows that
the notion of self-estrangement seems to exist in associa-
tion with certain common qualitative characters: namely,
loss of control, which reflects a deteriorative estrangement,
and distorted perception of capacities, which reveals a
restorative estrangement.
EMBODIMENT: HAVING A BRAIN IMPLANT VERSUS
BEING A BRAIN IMPLANT
Another way to understand how DBS might induce feelings
of estrangement is to examine whether DBS has an effect in
terms of being understood as a foreign intrusion; that is,
whether the patients viewed the device as being a part of, or
not a part of, themselves. For instance, for Patient 08, “It’s just
become part of me. It’s more the other way around. It’s more
the DBS becomes a part of who you are rather than changing
you.” In this case the patient identifies with or sees him- or
herself as continuous with his or her stimulated self. In con-
trast, when the device is seen as other or an outside force, it
could contribute to feelings of self-estrangement.
However, our study found that the hypothesis—that if
patients incorporate the DBS device into their self-image/
body schema, then they will suffer less from self-estrange-
ment—is not as robust as it sounds. In general, the patients
interviewed did not notice the device in their body while it
was doing its job in the background, despite having experi-
enced some degrees and intermittent episodes of self-
estrangement. Many noted that the device had a minimal
presence in their body and that they did not typically notice
that it was there. For example, Patient 13 declared, “I charged
myself up this morning”; Patient 12 asserted, “I just don’t
know it’s there. I don’t feel invaded.” Patient 06 affirmed,
“It’s part of me.” Patient 05 indicated, “More a part of my
body.” Such responses appear to illustrate that patients use a
language that seemingly incorporates the DBS device into
their self or body image. Patient 13 clearly uses such meta-
phorical language; he does not say “I charged the devices up
this morning” but rather “I charged myself up.” Such lan-
guage could indicate an embodied acceptance of the implant,
of patients feeling like being one with the implant.
Nonetheless, we did find a correlative example
between the device felt as an alien entity and a patient
experiencing self-estrangement. Patient 04, who experi-
enced the most severe and harmful effects of estrangement
in our study, declared the following in response to the
interviewer’s question:
Interviewer 1: “The implant, do you feel that it is part of you?”
Patient 04: “ No!”
Interviewer 1: “You feel that it is alien?”
Patient 04: “I hate it. I wish I could pull it out!”
Aside from this obvious case with Patient 04, who
clearly experienced having a foreign device rather than it
being part of her (i.e., language of being the device), most
patients incorporated the devices. A few complained that it
hampered, or had hampered, physical activity in the past.
Patient 08 said, “I used to be able to feel the electricity going
through my body but I don’t feel it now . . . I forget about it
most of the time, but I am aware because there is a hard lit-
tle thing on your chest.” Others had (perhaps unwarranted)
fears about others interfering with the device accidentally
(one research participant instructed hairdressers not to use
clippers on her neck in case it damaged the wires). But in
general, patients seemed to regard the device as something
that had been integrated into their body. Most did not view
it as a foreign entity that existed separately from their own
self. The fact that patients tend to forget about the DBS
implant might be construed as a positive thing because, in
the end, they may focus less on their disease. This percep-
tion prevents DBS from having a felt intrusive quality. An
interesting general point is that patients with non-recharge-
able devices seemed not to notice the device as much, and it
didn’t have as much presence to them. Some patients with
rechargeable devices noticed it a lot more, sometimes
obsessing over its charge.5
In addition to exploring whether and how the implant
altered patients’ relationship to their body, we can explore
the relationship to changed capacities of the body. Patients’
measure of restoration often correlated with their physical
abilities, and they declared being more independent (e.g.,
patients 16 and 17). However, as also noted in the preced-
ing, some patients overestimated their capacities, in some
cases beyond what they were capable of prior to the stimu-
lation and the onset of PD. These experiences were often
connected with a feeling of a loss or lack of control.
SUMMARIZING DBS POSTOPERATIVE SELF-
ESTRANGEMENT
Our study demonstrates that there are various qualita-
tively different kinds of self-estrangement experiences.
To speak of a postoperative estrangement implies that
5. There were some fears concerning what would happen if the
device was not charged correctly (i.e., for those with rechargeable
batteries). Some research participants took a very conservative
attitude toward the battery charge and constantly monitored and
topped up the battery. Others were very casual and let the battery
run down a lot. The people who were concerned about monitoring
the charge level were also people who seemed to have some anxi-
eties about the implications of what would happen if the device
ran out of power. Those who were more casual seemed to not har-
bor those sorts of fears. One person accidentally turned off his
device at one point and only noticed a few hours later when he
had trouble typing. But it was easily remedied and the event did
not bother him or give him any further anxieties.
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the relevant patient experience of deteriorative or
restorative estrangement has an irreducibly subjective
character specific to the implanted individual (Atkins
2000). The postoperative feelings of estrangement con-
stitute a patient’s first-personal point of view of a quali-
tatively deteriorative or restorative experience.
Experiencing deteriorative or restorative self-estrange-
ment does not mean a subject is experiencing X differ-
ently (e.g., X being an emotion, perception, thought,
etc.), but rather that the experience of being the subject
of X is qualitatively different. Experiencing X differ-
ently is not the same as experiencing oneself as qualita-
tively different. In other words, in some cases, the
experience of X can feel different while the experiencer
remains identical. Accordingly, an experiencer can feel
estranged while the experience of X feels identical in
some cases. In that respect, being self-estranged cannot
be reduced to experiencing X differently; it rather
involves an irreducibly novel experience of being the
subjective character of X (experiencer is necessarily
qualitatively different, but not necessarily X). Being a
subject of X does not involve estrangement when the
subjective experience is identical.
DBS ALONE DOES NOT DIRECTLY CAUSE POTENTIAL
SELF-ESTRANGEMENT
There is a lack of consensus about how to adequately
characterize the self vis-a-vis DBS treatment within the
neuroethical literature. The current state of the debate
is eclectic. Table 2 shows the numerous theoretical
models of the self motivated to explain the effects of
DBS on the self, including, but not limited to, the self
as characterized by “self-representational capacities”
(Synofizik and Schlaepfer 2008); as a “foundational-
functional model” (Witt et al. 2013); as narrative self-
constitution (Schechtman 2010) or relational narrative
constitution (Baylis 2013); as an “enactive, affordance-
based model” (De Haan et al. 2013); and as a “pattern
theory of self” (Dings and de Bruin 2015). In addition
to various models of the self, there is disagreement
about the central concept affected by DBS, autonomy,
and/or identity, and how to characterize these effects—
for example, autonomy in terms of patient autonomy or
competence, loss of control, and identity in terms of
changes to personality or psychological continuity, to
name a few. The conceptual understanding of agency
also varies in these accounts. Most philosophical discus-
sions concerned with potential DBS-induced effects on
the self are not based on firsthand studies (see
Table 2).6 Also, when examining the firsthand studies
from which the philosophical debate is inspired, we
quickly observe that these studies describe a wide
range of anatomical targets, as well as a diversity of
unwanted personality changes associated with postop-
erative DBS intervention.
Further, there is a potential to claim that DBS directly
causes these changes. It is often inferred in the nonscien-
tific literature that DBS intervention poses a postoperative
threat to personal identity, or induces some unwanted per-
sonality changes or has an unintended effect on the self.
For instance, some have written, “The risk of becoming
another person following surgery is alarming” (Witt et al.
2013) and “personality changes represent a threat to per-
sonal identity and agency” (Schechtman 2010). We catego-
rize these positions as a “post hoc ergo propter hoc”-
related assumption. Many neuroethical and philosophical
documents7 are guilty of perpetuating this assumption
with little examination or scrutiny.
What do subjective self-reports from PD patients with
DBS show us about the potential for self-estrangement?
Our study found that 8 patients among 17 (47%) experi-
enced some degrees of, and intermittent episodes, of self-
estrangement. These results align with clinical reports,
which indicate that the phenomenon of “becoming a dif-
ferent person” after DBS intervention may not be solely
attributed to the electrical stimulation itself but could be
caused by treatment adjustments post surgery or by dis-
ease progression (Volkmann, Daniels, and Witt 2010). As
such, the prevalence and incidence of self-estrangement
might not be exclusively correlated with a specific DBS tar-
get and/or stimulation parameter but rather should be
seen as a result of the interaction between the neural and
glial effects of electrode insertion during surgery (Vedam-
Mai et al. 2012) and electrical stimulation, adjustments in
medication, and natural progression of the disease (Volk-
mann, Daniels, and Witt 2010), especially when DBS is
used in patients with neurodegenerative disorders where
changes to personality and identity are inevitable regard-
less of treatment course and choices. Although DBS affects
spiking activity and neurotransmitter release in local
(Hammond et al. 2008; Cheney et al. 2013) and distant cir-
cuits (Li et al. 2014), turning off stimulation won’t conclu-
sively allow dissociation of personal identity changes as a
result of electrical stimulation from DBS and as a result of
associated treatment modifications and disease prognosis.
This is further complicated by the potential of DBS to
induce long-term synaptic changes in the brain (Herring-
ton, Cheng, and Eskandar 2015). However, some case
reports do seem to suggest that turning off the stimulation
ends, for instance, an episode of mania or impulsivity
(Tsai et al. 2010), and if longer term synaptic changes are
made, then we might not expect the personality changes to
disappear with the removal of stimulation (Gilbert 2013b).
Overall, changes in identity, personality, and self-aware-
ness during DBS not only should be attributed to the DBS
target structure, surgical trajectory, and stimulation
6. We do not have enough space to adequately characterize the
accounts in Table 2 concerning the potential DBS-induced effects
on the self. Rather, we aim to examine a patient’s postoperative
phenomenological experience of first-personal or subjective
change, especially responses, or feelings of, self-estrangement. 7. Though not necessarily all those listed in Table 2.
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parameter, but also should account for patient history, dis-
ease attributes, and other forms of treatment adaptations
such as medication adjustments and psychotherapy.
At this point in time, it is relatively difficult to isolate
the cause of these postoperative changes, though they
have been associated with DBS. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no neurobiological studies claim that postoperative
personality changes can be predicted solely on the basis of
DBS itself or an exclusive neurobiological cause. Even in a
tragic case where a patient implanted with DBS died by
suicide, an indirect causal explanation was used in the
legal case to argue that postoperative changes are “more
likely than not to have been due in significant but unquan-
tifiable measure to the DBS” (Dillon 2014).
A similar relationship is seen in Parkinson’s disease
patients who develop compulsive behaviors or impulse
control disorders (ICD) (e.g., compulsive gambling,
shopping, and eating) associated with dopamine
replacement therapy. As seen during our interviews,
many patients reported self-changes due to medication.
This correlates with other findings that show that almost
17% of individuals with PD who are treated with dopa-
mine agonists (DA) will develop an ICD (Ambermoon
et al. 2011). There is strong evidence that DA plays an
important causal role: These behaviors tend to emerge
soon after commencing the medication or increasing
doses, and they often resolve when the medication is
stopped, as some of our patients reported. There is also
a plausible explanation for how dopaminergic medica-
tions would lead to compulsive behaviors. The medica-
tion only plays a partial causal role: the overwhelming
majority of individuals do not develop these disorders.
There are also predictable individual differences that
identify the likelihood of developing a compulsive
behavior, such as having a personal or family history of
addictive or impulsive behavior. The sorts of behaviors
that emerge appear to be heavily influenced by social
factors: Women tend to engage in compulsive shopping
and eating, while men are more likely to develop patho-
logical gambling or hypersexuality.
In short, this work does not advocate that DBS alone
directly causes potential personality changes.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
There are a number of limitations in this study. It is
important to clarify what the study was, and was not,
doing. There is concern with the lack of data concerning
first-personal phenomenological reports or assessments
of neural implants, which this article in some sense
seeks to address. Connected to this point is the concern
that no generalizable conclusions can be drawn from
such limited data. While looking at the phenomenology
of DBS might be a useful tool for describing the lived
experiences of implanted patients, it remains severely
impoverished as a theory for explaining it (Sholl 2015).
However, we are not attempting to draw generalizable
conclusions on the basis of numbers, but rather, we aim
to examine phenomenological first-personal reports to
inform understandings of the impacts of DBS on
patients’ self, with a focus on self-estrangement.
First, it should be recognized that drawing on subjec-
tive or first-personal phenomenological accounts of how a
person feels about or experiences their implant does not
provide us with enough context to assess the (objective)
accuracy of these accounts. Estrangement is not necessarily
self-perceived. As other studies have demonstrated, rela-
tives are often more sensitive to alterations in self than the
patients themselves (Pham et al. 2015). In addition to what
we discussed in the previous section, Patient 03 reported,
“I don’t feel different at all. Some people said to me that I
am a bit different.” Correspondingly, Patient 06 reported,
“I think I have been causing a bit of problems in my
relationships.” Also, the epistemic role of the first-personal
perspective may be limited, particularly in the case of
induced mania. We are not questioning the what-it’s-like-
ness but rather the consistency of the narration. As family
members pointed out to Patient 04, “They said they don’t
recognize me . . . I am so impulsive and seem to change my
mind all the time.” Here it is not the experiential-qualita-
tive character of being manic which is problematic, but
rather the consistency of the narrative account. Families
and social context are an essential measurement of how
patients are experiencing potential estrangement, even if
patients do not perceive it. An extended study would not
only involve interviewing the implanted patients, but also
their close relatives. In the current study, patients were
asked whether their relatives mentioned any postoperative
changes, but systematically interviewing patients’ relatives
would have likely generated more data.
Second, and more importantly, our study merely asked
patients to report on their perception of self-change. As
such, it provides a limited amount of information about
patients’ uptake and adaptation over time. As such, there
is insufficient evidence to draw conclusions about how the
implants affect autonomy and identity and consequently
to draw conclusions about the impacts on autonomy and
identity. An extended version of the study should also
include interviews made before the intervention, and at
least two follow-ups; this would add important insights
regarding the degree of “self-deception” of patients when
remembering their state prior to surgery. Further, the
study should include focus on the patient’s engagement
with the world and his or her implant, in addition to
reporting on perception of self-change.
Despite these identified limitations, we strongly
believe that we can draw some robust and common find-
ings from the patient postoperative narratives, as we have
done in the preceding, and on the basis of these findings
make some conclusions, as summarized in the following.
Further, exploring patient’s first-personal experience of
DBS can inform and guide patients through decision-mak-
ing processes leading to implantation, and can also answer
questions of patients currently experiencing self-estrange-
ment phenomenon.
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CONCLUSIONS
Subjective self-reports from PD patients with DBS help us
to understand some aspects of potential postoperative self-
estrangement. The way patients perceive themselves
through pathology will likely dictate the way they will
experience potential DBS-induced self-estrangement; self-
perception through pathology will likely dictate degrees of
whether patients self-perceive DBS as something that is
restorative. The notion of self-estrangement seems to exist
in association with certain common qualitative characters:
(1) loss of control and (2) distorted perception of capacities.
The first is mostly associated with a deteriorative sense of
the self, and the second is largely related to a restorative
one. Most implanted patients we interviewed experienced
a shift in their self-perception, mostly in a restorative
sense, especially during calibration. Some feelings of dete-
rioration were experienced in relation to powerlessness,
which resulted in severe harm in one case. This evidence
supports the hypothesis that postoperative feelings of
powerlessness play a crucial role in causing harm (Gilbert
2013a, 2015a). This study demonstrates that DBS, as a
whole, increases autonomous restorative power over one’s
self, rather than a deterioration of the self. This is anec-
dotally supported by our interviews with patients who
reported a sensation of empowerment. The explanation for
this may reside in the concept of embodiment, where the
device is felt to become part of the individual, rather than
as a foreign despot exerting control (Amadio and Boulis
2015).
It appears from these clusters that most patients expe-
rience a proportionally restorative sense of the self. This
evidence justifies the claim that, generally speaking, DBS
is not a threat to personal, but some patients might not
experience well any form of estrangement. Patients would
benefit from being informed ahead of any potential risks,
prior to consenting to being implanted, as in other types of
invasive brain intervention (Via~na, Vickers et al. 2017; Gil-
bert et al. 2014; Via~na, Bittlinger et al. 2017; Gilbert 2015b;
Bretzner et al. 2011; Gilbert, Vranic, and Hurst 2013; Gil-
bert 2014; Gilbert et al. 2015; Vranic & Gilbert 2014; Gilbert
& Cook 2015; Gilbert 2017; Gilbert & Dodds 2013; Gilbert
& Focquaert 2015; Gilbert & Vranic 2015).
This study highlights the importance of the first-per-
sonal perspective and subjective assessments when consid-
ering the impacts of implants and the need for more
assessments. More significantly, however, we argue that
further and more fuller phenomenological exploration of
how patients respond to their neural implants is needed in
order to draw conclusions about the impacts of DBS on
autonomy and identity. This would involve interrogating
patients’ agency over time so that we can make an assess-
ment of whether initial disruptions, feelings of self-
estrangement, and failures in decision making are short-
term or long-term phenomena. Furthermore, this would
involve assessing how patients live with their implants,
with a focus on whether the implant facilitates or hinders
their capacities to engage in the world.
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APPENDIX: SEMISTRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCRIPT
These are examples of generic questions. They are an indi-
cation of the structure to be followed during the inter-
views, rather than the actual questions to be asked to
patients. The choice of words, terminology, or languages
may change slightly for each patient.
1. Potential questions regarding postoperative sense of the
self.
i. What was it like to live without the deep brain stim-
ulation (DBS) device? Did you feel comfortable in
yourself with your medical condition? How did you
feel that your medical condition affected your life?
ii. What is it like to be implanted with DBS? Do you
feel any significant difference from before the
device compared to after it was implanted?
 Please provide some examples. Did you expect to
find differences or changes prior to the operation?
iii. Have others commented on any changes to you
(e.g., personality, habits, etc.) since being
implanted? If so, do you agree with them? Why or
why not?
iv. (Depending on previous answers) Do you think
you may change/change more in the future as a
result of this intervention?
2. Potential questions regarding the sense of control.
i. Prior to the implantation of DBS, how would you
describe your control over your life? (e.g., through
habits, daily activities, etc.)
ii. Do you feel the device has increased your auton-
omy (e.g., making you less dependent on others)?
For instance, has it improved your life, control on
symptoms? Has it given you back more control
over your life?
iii. Have others commented that you have better con-
trol over your life/symptoms/yourself? Do you
agree with them? If not, why not?
iv. (Depending on previous answers) If you experi-
enced the device as form of control, does it feel
authentic? From your own personal experience, do
you see it as a novel control?
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